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Abstract
A number of disasters in various places of the planet have caused an extensive loss of lives, severe damages to
properties and the environment, as well as a tremendous shock to the survivors. For relief and mitigation
operations, emergency responders are immediately dispatched to the disaster areas. Ubiquitous and robust
communications during the emergency response operations are of paramount importance. Nevertheless, various
reports have highlighted that after many devastating events, the current technologies used, failed to support the
mission critical communications, resulting in further loss of lives. Inefficiencies of the current communications used
for emergency response include lack of technology inter-operability between different jurisdictions, and high
vulnerability due to their centralized infrastructure. In this article, we propose a flexible network architecture that
provides a common networking platform for heterogeneous multi-operator networks, for interoperation in case of
emergencies. A wireless mesh network is the main part of the proposed architecture and this provides a back-up
network in case of emergencies. We first describe the shortcomings and limitations of the current technologies,
and then we address issues related to the applications and functionalities a future emergency response network
should support. Furthermore, we describe the necessary requirements for a flexible, secure, robust, and QoS-aware
emergency response multi-operator architecture, and then we suggest several schemes that can be adopted by
our proposed architecture to meet those requirements. In addition, we suggest several methods for the re-tasking
of communication means owned by independent individuals to provide support during emergencies. In order to
investigate the feasibility of multimedia transmission over a wireless mesh network, we measured the performance
of a video streaming application in a real wireless metropolitan multi-radio mesh network, showing that the mesh
network can meet the requirements for high quality video transmissions.
Keywords: Wireless mesh networks, Public safety, Emergency response, Inter-operability, Re-tasking, Security, Ubi-
quitous environments, Heterogeneous networks, 3G, TETRA, WiMAX, Wi-Fi
Introduction
Disasters in various places of the planet have caused an
extensive loss of lives, severe damages in properties and
a tremendous shock to the survivors and their relatives.
Several other serious outcomes are observed after a dis-
aster, like social effects as looting, economic pressures
as loss of tourism industry, etc [1]. Natural disasters like
the Hurricane Katrina in US, the tsunami in Asia, or
man-made attacks like the 9/11 terrorist attack in New
York in 2001, and the London bombings in 2005, have
shown that the use of communications and network
connectivity is of vital importance for saving lives.
Immediately after an emergency incident, first respon-
ders (e.g., police, fire fighters, medical personnel, etc.)
are sent to the disaster area for mitigation and relief
operations. As the first minutes (or hours) are vital to
save human lives, robust ubiquitous communications
should be available to first responders. However, experi-
ence has shown that during rescue operations after
devastating events, several technology inefficiencies have
made communication between the rescuers problematic.
For example, during the 9/11 attacks, police issued
* Correspondence: alfrag@ics.forth.gr
1Institute of Computer Science of the Foundation for Research and
Technology-Hellas (FORTH), P.O. Box 1385, 711 10 Heraklion, Crete, Greece
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Fragkiadakis et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2011, 2011:13
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2011/1/13
© 2011 Fragkiadakis et al; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
warnings asking for immediate evacuation of the second
building. Unfortunately, the fire department was unable
to receive these warnings because the equipment fire
fighters used, was not compatible with that of the police
[2]. As a result, hundreds of lives were lost. After Hurri-
cane Katrina in US in 2004, communication channels
were severely disrupted, causing great difficulties to res-
cuers, as well as to the victims [3]. In Enschede the
Netherlands, a fireworks depot exploded in 2000
destroying a large part of the city. Only a few minutes
after the explosion, the GSM network became inoper-
able [4].
The previous examples show that current technologies
impose several limitations and vulnerabilities that can
lead to problematic and inefficient performance during
emergency situations. Major limitations and vulnerabil-
ities are: lack of technology inter-operability between
rescuers’ equipment that belongs to different jurisdic-
tions (e.g., police, fire department, army), infrastructure-
based operation of the current technologies used (e.g.,
TETRA [5]) whose parts can be destroyed during a dis-
aster, and the severe overloading of several mobile com-
munication channels (e.g., 3G). This article addresses all
those issues and proposes a flexible network architecture
that provides a common networking platform for het-
erogeneous multi-operator networks, for inter-operation
in case of emergencies. A wireless mesh network is the
main part of the proposed architecture providing a
backup network in the case of emergencies. We address
issues related to the applications and functionalities a
future emergency response network should support, and
the shortcomings and limitations of the current technol-
ogies. Furthermore, we describe the necessary require-
ments for a flexible, secure, robust, and QoS-aware
emergency response multi-operator architecture, and
then we suggest several schemes that can be adopted by
our proposed architecture to meet these requirements.
In addition, we propose several methods for the re-task-
ing of communication means owned by independent
individuals, in order to provide support during emergen-
cies. Finally, we measure the performance of a video
streaming application in a real wireless metropolitan
multi-radio mesh network, showing that the mesh net-
work can meet the requirements for high quality video
transmission.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
In Sect. 2 the applications and functionalities a future
emergency response communication architecture should
support, are described. In Sect. 3 we analyze the various
wireless technologies that are used or can be used for
emergency response, by focusing on their limitations/
shortcomings, as well as on their benefits to meet cer-
tain requirements. Sect. 4 includes a survey on research
efforts regarding communication networks for public
safety and emergency response. In Sect. 5 we propose
our communication architecture for emergency response
operations. The performance evaluation of a video
streaming application in a metropolitan wireless multi-
radio mesh networks is presented in Sect. 6. Finally,
conclusions appear in Sect. 7.
Required modes of communication for emergency
response
After an emergency call has been received, vehicles and
personnel belonging to various jurisdictions are sent to
the incident scene. Rescuers have to immediately seek
for people who need immediate help. At the same time,
they have to setup communications for various tasks
such as, data transmission to the corresponding head-
quarter, medical data fetching from hospitals’ databases
regarding the medical history of the injured persons, etc.
In addition, cooperation through communication chan-
nels between the rescue teams located in nearby loca-
tions may be necessary for the efficient coordination of
the emergency operation; thus, the communication sys-
tem used, is expected to efficiently integrate a plethora
of applications with different requirements and perfor-
mance objectives [6]. Applications and functionalities a
future emergency response communication architecture
should support, are described in the next sections.
Video
For emergency response operations, first responders
often need to share vital information. This may necessi-
tate the transmission of real time video to a control cen-
ter. Typical scenarios include the transmission of live
video footage from a disaster area to the fire depart-
ment’s command center and/or to the nearby located
fire fighters. Another scenario is the broadcasting of live
video footage from a protest march to the police offi-
cers, immediately after violence has broken out.
For video transmission, specific network requirements
should be met for an acceptable QoS. The required net-
work throughput depends on the video frame rate, the
resolution, and the color. In [7], the authors conducted
video quality testing to estimate the quality of video,
first responders find acceptable for tactical video appli-
cations. The testing shows that: (i) a minimum of 10
frames per second for SIF (360 × 240) or SD (720 ×
486) sizes is recommended, and (ii) a minimum of 1 sec
video delay (end-to-end transmission) is recommended.
Additionally, for MPEG-2 encoding, a minimum of 1.5
Mbps coder bit rate should be used, while for MPEG-4
the minimun coder bit rate should be 768 Kbps.
Audio/voice
Applications that provide voice services between two
peers for supporting public safety operations have
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become firmly established over the decades [8]. Land
mobile radio (LMR) [9] provides half duplex operation
requiring the user to “push to talk”. However, the public
safety communications community is looking towards a
future family of full-duplex public safety speech trans-
mission services [8]. Parameters that affect voice quality
are [10]: (i) the packet loss correlation (when it is zero,
the packet loss process is random), (ii) the packet loss
ratio, and (iii) the packet size that can vary depending
on the type of the network used (e.g., IP). Of course,
voice quality also depends on the compression algorithm
used. As an example, in [10] several experiments con-
ducted regarding voice quality, show that 70% of the
public safety practitioners judge that voice quality is
acceptable if the packet loss ratio is up to 5% and the
packet size is either 10 or 40 ms.
The bandwidth requirements can vary depending on
the type of voice service. According to [11], for telecon-
ference voice transmission services, 1 Mbps is required
with low tolerance on delay, while for voice over the
phone, 65 Kbps are required, however, with very low
delay tolerance.
Push-to-talk
Push-to-talk (PTT) is a technology that allows half-
duplex communication between two users, using a
momentary button to switch from voice reception mode
to transmit mode. PTT works in a “walkie-talkie” fash-
ion having several features and benefits [12]:
• instant contact, as by pressing a button users can
instantly connect without the need to dial numbers
or having to wait for connection establishment,
• group talk, where users can form groups by regis-
tering to the PTT group service. One user can talk,
while the rest can listen to him at the same time,
• cost saver (compared to e.g., SMS with 3G), as
PTT messages can be delivered to multiple users at
the same time.
The first two features of PTT technology (instant con-
tact, group talk) can be valuable in case of emergencies,
as first responders can quickly setup and use this com-
munication mean. PTT over cellular (PoC) is the push-
to-talk voice service used in mobile communications.
This provides one-to-one and one-to-many communica-
tions based on half-duplex VoIP technology.
Real time text messaging (RTT)
Text messaging is an effective and quick solution for
sending alerts in case of emergencies. Typical examples
of its use can include: (i) individuals reporting suspi-
cious actions to the police, (ii) people affected by a dis-
aster communicating with their relatives, (iii) authorities
informing the public about possible disasters (e.g., hurri-
cane, fire, flooding), etc. Types of text messaging can be
SMS, email, instant messages, etc. [13]. The require-
ments of real text messaging are not high, as 28 Kbps
can be adequate for this type of application [11].
Location and status information
Location and status information can be of vital impor-
tance. During emergency operations, victims’ locations
can guide first responders to provide immediate medical
support. Location information could be obtained
through the use of several technologies. For example,
4G networks are expected to provide more accurate
location information than the 3G networks that are
solely based on GPS technology, which is not very accu-
rate. Simpler devices such as RFID tags can provide
location information not only for injured persons but
also for the equipment and the medical personnel; thus
enhancing the efficiency of the relief operations. At the
moment, GPS technology is used for location informa-
tion in outdoor environments, while RFID tags and Wi-
Fi-based location systems are used indoors [14].
Status information is referred to the status of several
types of objects within a jurisdiction area. For example,
in public safety operations, a sensor network can broad-
cast information related to the environmental tempera-
ture, the level of water, etc. In emergency operations,
RFID tags placed on the injured persons by the medical
personnel, can classify them into different levels depend-
ing on their criticality (e.g., life threatening, severely
injured, etc.).
Broadcasting, multicasting
Broadcasting is referred to the ability to transmit infor-
mation to all users, while multicasting is the ability to
send information to a group of users. Both functional-
ities, if supported by technology, can enhance public
safety and rescue operations. For example, suspicious
actions outside a bank can trigger the transmission of
live video footage to the nearby police cars
(multicasting).
Current technologies and their limitations/
benefits for emergency response communications
This section describes several technologies used for
massive communications, focusing on their shortcom-
ings and limitations, as well as on their benefits for
emergency communications.
Cellular networks
Cellular network technology was introduced in 1981
with the 1G systems. Since then, almost every a decade,
a new generation appears characterized by new frequen-
cies, higher data rates, and backwards compatible
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transmission technology. After 1G that was dedicated to
analog mobile radio communications, 2.5G offered digi-
tal communications with transmissions rates up to 115
Kbps and 2.75G offered up to 236.8 Kbps. Nowadays,
3G technologies can offer slightly more than 2 Mbps of
bandwidth for stationary users, while up to 384 Kbps for
moving users. They also have high coverage providing
high mobility that combined by the rapid proliferation
of smart phones (according to [15] smart phones in US
will undertake feature phones by 2011), have dominated
a significantly large part of the telecommunications mar-
ket. 3G are all-IP networks; networks that offer inte-
grated enhanced service sets (functionalities over IP)
that are independent of the access system used. Univer-
sal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) is one
of the 3G technologies widely used. Figure 1 shows a
3G (UMTS) network architecture. Newer technologies
such as HSPA/3.5G can provide up to 14 Mbps.
Cellular networks can provide valuables services in
case of disasters but only if they are available. For exam-
ple in [16], the authors describe an architecture that
based on information it receives from cell phone net-
works, detects possible emergencies and evaluates possi-
ble actions to deal with them. A convenient method for
transmission of short messages in case of emergencies
in massive scales, is cell broadcasting. Cell broadcasting
is an existing feature of GSM and UMTS; however, it is
rarely used. It could be of very high value to take advan-
tage of this functionality in emergency situations, as it
can be used even if the network is overloaded [17].
Furthermore, the Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Ser-
vice (MBMS) could be used in the case of emergencies.
MBMS is a relatively new service that supports broad-
cast and multicast over UMTS networks [18]. The ser-
vice types provided by MBMS are [19]: (i) continuous
media streaming (audio and video), (ii) binary data
downloading by multiple receivers, and (iii) carousel: a
streaming and download combination with synchroniza-
tion constraints. The Digital Video Broadcasting-Hand-
held (DVB-H) and Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB)
that can provide high-speed video and audio services
over 3G infrastructures, could also be used in
emergencies.
However, in several big disasters, cellular network ser-
vices have become completely unavailable [20] because
their centralized infrastructure makes them vulnerable
to threats like power outage, physical damages of the
base stations (BSs), etc. As an example, if RNC (Figure
RNC
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Core Network
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Figure 1 3G network architecture.
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1) becomes inoperable, the users associated to either
BS1 or BS2 will not be able to communicate with the
outside world.
Satellite communications
Satellite are the only infrastructures that are not suscepti-
ble to damage from disasters, as the main repeaters for sig-
nal transmission and reception are located outside Earth’s
atmosphere [21]. They are also immune to terrestrial con-
gestion, providing coverage even in sparsely populated
areas where no cellular BSs or other means of communi-
cation facilities exist. Satellite communications can provide
high-speed data transmissions and video conferencing that
can be used in case of emergencies (e.g., [22-24]). Very
small aperture terminals (VSAT) technology has become
very popular for satellite IP services providing interactive
real-time data. However, VSAT technology has several
shortcomings as asymmetrical transmission rates and
weight and cost of equipment [25]. Furthermore, satellite
communication equipment can be used only by a limited
number of trained personnel; thus not being available for
massive use by individuals.
Terrestrial trunked radio (TETRA)
TETRA [5] is one of the most important technologies of
the personal mobile radio used in the market, for public
safety and emergency response operations. TETRA mar-
ket has expanded to more than 88 countries worldwide
[26]. Its advantages include high spectral efficiency, fast
call setup, communication flexibility with one-to-one,
one-to-many and many-to-many communication pat-
terns [27]. TETRA has two modes of operation:
• Trunked Mode Operation (TMO). In TMO
mode, TETRA operations rely on a fixed private cel-
lular infrastructure with the use of BSs. The network
assigns channels and transports radio signals
between the users. Similar to the 3G infrastructures,
TETRA-TMO due to its centralized nature, can
become unable to fulfill its mission in big disasters if
any of its key nodes fail (e.g., Controller in Figure 2).
• Direct Mode Operation (DMO). This mode
allows the direct communication between the
TETRA mobile nodes (TMNs) without the need to
use the fixed cellular infrastructure. DMO allows
nodes to communicate in an (optionally) encrypted
fashion using TDMA and preemption mechanisms.
However, TETRA-DMO does not offer multihop
capability; thus it provides limited coverage to the
users. In addition, the transmission rate of an
encoded TETRA data stream varies from 2.4 to 7.2
Kbps [4]. All calls (one-to-many, one-to-one, many-
to-many) are half-duplex, supporting only up to two
calls per frequency carrier; hence limiting the scal-
ability of the network in terms of the number of
users that can be active at the same time [27].
All the above shortcomings make the pure TETRA
network functionalities problematic for use in future
emergency communications.
Wi-Fi
The mandate of FCC [28] in 1985 for the opening of sev-
eral bands of the wireless spectrum on a non-licence basis,
has allowed the evolution of the Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity)
BS1
BS2
TMN1
TMN2
Controller ISIinterfaceGateway
Other
TETRA
Networks
BS: Base Station
TMN: TETRA Mobile Node
ISI: Intersystem Interface
Figure 2 TETRA network architecture.
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technology. The so-called Industrial, Scientific and Medi-
cal (ISM) band can be used for wireless communication
without the need for a licence purchase. The subsequent
evolution of the corresponding protocols (IEEE 802.11a/b/
g), made Wi-Fi a ubiquitous communications mean for
the provision of multi-Mbps internet access. Thousands of
IEEE 802.11 hotspots serve millions of users in several
public places (e.g., airports, shopping malls, etc.). Regard-
ing transmission rates, IEEE 802.11b can offer up to 11
Mbps while 802.11a/g up to 54 Mbps.
However, as Wi-Fi uses the ISM band for transmissions,
and given the proliferation of this technology, interference
between devices transmitting on neighboring channels can
be present very often (see [29]). For this reason, the trans-
mission power of the antennas are regulated so as Wi-Fi
provides short coverage and thus it does not interfere with
neighboring wireless networks. Wi-Fi coverage is limited
to about 200 m [25]; therefore, such a coverage is not ade-
quate for emergency operations, as disaster areas can span
to several hundreds of meters or kilometers.
WiMAX
World Wide Inter-operability for Microwave Access
(WiMAX) is the user-friendly name of the IEEE 802.16
protocol [30]. This technology uses licensed parts of the
spectrum (e.g., 3.5 GHz) offering broadband wireless
access up to 50 km for fixed stations and up to 15 km
for mobile stations. Figure 3 shows a typical WiMAX
network architecture. The Access and Service Network
(ASN) contains the BSs and an ASN gateway (ASN-
GW). BSs provide the air interface, serving a number of
mobile nodes (MNs) that are further connected to the
outside world through the ASN-GW. ASN-GW provides
several functionalities such as intra-ASN location man-
agement and paging, admission control, authentication,
authorization and accounting (AAA) client functionality,
etc. The Core Network (CN) contains the necessary
hosts/services for AAA, and mobility management
through the Home Agent (HA) server. CN also provides
connectivity to the internet or other public or corporate
networks. WiMAX-enabled devices can achieve trans-
mission rates up to 63 Mbps within a cell radius of 5
km [31]. WiMAX technology is rapidly expanding as
newer versions of smart phones are equipped with wire-
less interfaces that support it. Furthermore, the use of
WiMAX-enabled femtocells (small cellular BSs [32]) is
continuously spreading, as their use substantially
increases WiMAX coverage and performance.
MN1
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WiMAX BS1
WiMAX BS2
MN4
Access
Network
ASN-GW
IP
Network
AAA
Server
HA
Core Network
DHCP
Server
BS: Base Station
MN: Mobile Node
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Figure 3 WiMAX network architecture.
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As Figure 3 shows, WiMAX has a centralized infra-
structure; thus in case of big disasters, several major
components of its architecture can become single points
of failure. For example, if ASN-WG becomes inoperable,
the connected MNs will not be able to communicate
with the outside world. In addition, newly arrived MNs
will not be able to authenticate to the WiMAX network,
as they will not be able to reach CN network and the
AAA server. Therefore, WiMAX architectures have a
high risk to become inoperable in big disasters.
Table 1 summarizes the limitations and benefits of the
current technologies for use in emergency response mis-
sion critical communications.
A survey on network architectures for emergency
operations
Given the shortcomings of the current technologies,
there are significant efforts by the research community
on defining new architectures for effective and reliable
public safety and emergency response. This section
describes several of those efforts. The related contribu-
tions can be broadly classified into three categories: ad
hoc, mesh, and hybrid mesh and ad hoc.
In general, the ad hoc and mesh architectures can
provide robust and reliable communications, as they do
not rely on infrastructure backbones. A mobile ad hoc
network (MANET) is a group of wireless nodes that
dynamically self-organize in arbitrary and temporary
network topologies [33]. The advantages of this technol-
ogy is that communication nodes can be inter-net-
worked (within their radio transmission ranges) without
the need of a pre-existing infrastructure.
Mesh networks consist of two fundamental entities:
mesh routers and mesh clients. Mesh clients connect to
mesh routers that are further connected to other (mesh)
routers forming a multihop architecture. Mesh routers
can be equipped with multiple antennas and radios;
hence, increasing spectral efficiency and providing
acceptable QoS, through reduction of the internal and
external channel interference. Furthermore, mesh rou-
ters can act as gateways and connect to other networks
(e.g., IEEE 802.3). Mesh networks have several advan-
tages such as low up-front cost, easy network mainte-
nance, robustness, reliable service provision, high
coverage, etc. [34].
In [25], the authors mention wireless mesh networking
as a key solution for emergency and rural applications.
They describe MITOC, an off-the-shelf commercial sys-
tem that includes several types of nodes and diverse
functionalities, such as satellite communication term-
inals, radio BSs, IP-based radio inter-operability, a VoIP
telephone switch, etc. In [35], a ballooned mesh network
for supporting emergency operations is proposed. This
is formed by mesh clients placed on balloons, forming a
mesh network in the sky. Communication through the
balloons is performed using the IEEE 802.11j protocol,
while for the communication between the balloons and
the ground equipment, the IEEE 802.11b/g protocols are
used.
The deployment of high-bandwidth, robust, self-orga-
nizing MANETs can enable quicker response during
emergency operations [4]. In [36], the authors propose
an ad hoc architecture for medical emergency coordina-
tion. For scheduling doctors to casualties, an algorithm
inspired by the behavior of the ants in nature is used. A
virtual private ad hoc network platform is described in
[37]. This consists of a subset of several devices sharing
a common trust relationship and providing a secure,
transparent and self-administrating networks built on
top of heterogeneous networks. In [4], a broadband ad
hoc networking architecture for emergency services is
presented. The authors also describe several optimiza-
tions they have performed in various protocols (e.g.,
OLSR extensions for routing) for supporting critical
requirements.
Various other architectures are not purely based on ad
hoc or mesh networking, rather they combine a number
of different technologies. Bouckaert et al. [38], propose
GeoBIPS, a mixed mesh and ad hoc architecture for
emergency services. They use a camera and a video ser-
ver to send real time video from a disaster site to a
headquarter through a mesh network. For security, they
Table 1 Limitations/shortcomings and benefits of current technologies for emergency response communications
Technology Limitations/shortcomings Benefits
Cellular low to medium bandwidth, centralized architecture, high cost
of infrastructure deployment and maintenance
high mobility, high coverage, high penetration of smart phones,
broadcasting mechanisms for audio and video transmission
Satellite asymmetrical transmission rates, high cost of equipment,
heavy weight of equipment
immune to terrestrial congestion, coverage in even sparsely populated
areas, high transmission rates
TETRA centralised architecture, low transmission rates a good established and mature technology, expansion to many
countries
Wi-Fi limited coverage, intra and inter-channel interference high transmission rates, use of unlicensed spectrum, rapid proliferation
of Wi-Fi-enabled devices
WiMAX centralised architecture, licensed spectrum use, high cost of
infrastructure deployment and maintenance
high transmission rates, proliferation of WiMAX-enabled devices (e.g.
smart phones, femtocells)
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use IPsec and a pre-shared authentication scheme to
sign the OLSR routing messages. The authors in [20]
describe a hybrid wireless mesh network architecture for
emergency situations that can also take advantage of
pre-existing technologies, such as cellular, IEEE 802.11,
and bluetooth. A hybrid ad hoc and satellite IP network
operating with conventional terrestrial Internet, called
DUMBONET, is presented in [39]. The radio equipment
of first responders in each disaster site forms an ad hoc
network that is further interconnected to a headquarter
via satellite access. Karagiannis et al. [40], propose a
generalized network architecture (GAN) for supporing
ambient intelligent services and emergency services.
GAN interconnects several heterogeneous networks
(TETRA, UMTS, mesh, etc.). The authors give a high-
level description of the GAN architecture emphasizing
on several aspects like inter-operability, mobility and
network management, and security.
Except the aforementioned proposed architectures,
there is a number of related contributions that do not
explicitly define the type of the underlying network
architecture (e.g., ad hoc, etc.). Kurian et al. [41] pro-
pose ODON, a large-scale overlay network for mission
critical communications. This consists of four entities:
users who are pre-authorized by a destination server,
overlay nodes deployed across multiple Internet
domains, the destination server, and an ODON client
that is installed in clients’ equipments. In [13], the
authors exploit the idea of using a special-purpose net-
work that can be used in emergency situations, enabling
individuals to send short messages to friends or rela-
tives. This architecture is based on a special-purpose
social network where users use pre-assigned IDs for
sending their messages. Among several aspects, authors
address issues related to security and storage capacity
requirements. Ahmed et al. [42], describe a decentra-
lized cognitive radio based approach for information
exchange between first responders. It consists of four
core components: a publish/subscribe module, a rout-
ing/forwarding engine, a radio module, and a policy
module.
An emergency response communication network
architecture for missioncritical operations
This section proposes a new Emergency Response Com-
munication Network (ERCN) architecture that is based
on public communication networks, and on the re-task-
ing of the private network infrastructures. ERCN inter-
connects networking devices based on heterogeneous
technologies. The core component of this architecture is
a wireless mesh network (WMN) that can be either cre-
ated on-the-fly upon the event of an emergency, or be a
preexisting network used for day-by-day operations that
switches to an emergency mode when necessary.
At this point we classify the types of networks, ERCN
can interconnect in emergency situations.
Public communication networks
Public communication networks can be broadly classi-
fied into two categories. Operator Interest Networks
(OINs) that are deployed by major private operators, fol-
lowing a specific billing scheme for service provision.
OINs are heterogeneous in nature and can include 3G,
WiMAX, and Wi-Fi technologies. On the other hand,
Public Interest Networks (PINs) owned by governmental
or municipal authorities, are usually deployed to provide
communications between public authorities, as well as
to provide ubiquitous broadband wireless access to the
general public (e.g., through hotspots). Technologies uti-
lized by PINs are usually Wi-Fi with wireless hotspots,
dedicated wired IP backhauls, as well as WMNs in sev-
eral cities (e.g., [43]).
As mentioned in Sect. 3.3, TETRA has expanded in
many countries, used as a major communication mean
for public safety and emergency response. TETRA net-
works can be part of both OPNs and PINs. In both
cases, TETRA networks are not used by the general
public as they are mainly used for specific operations
such as emergency response or day-by-day routine
operations (e.g., communication between workers).
Private communication networks
Internet proliferation has been remarkable the last dec-
ade. The low subscription costs, the low cost of net-
working hardware/software equipment, the proliferation
of smart phones, the advances in technology (ADSL,
IEEE 802.11, etc.), all have contributed to the provision
of ubiquitous broadband internet access. Especially in
homes, ADSL technology has simplified (in terms of
cost and installation) network connectivity, providing
multi-Mbps transmission/reception rates, so millions of
homes nowadays are online in a 24 h base. Furthermore,
in-home Wi-Fi access points provide a convenient mean
to connect several devices between them, as well as to
the internet through the ADSL line. In addition, recent
advances such as the femtocells will provide even more
flexibility and enhanced in-home performance by con-
verging several technologies like (3G) mobile traffic over
ADSL or WiMAX over ADSL. We name this advanced
in-home networking facilities as Private Communication
Network (PCN), owned and operated by independent
individuals. In PCNs we could also include metropolitan
WMNs built by volunteers and technologist enthusiasts
as the Athens Wireless Metropolitan Network [44] that
has more than 1100 nodes, providing internet access to
more than 2900 client computers.
PCNs resources will be of high value if utilized during
an emergency by ERCN. As parts of the OINs and PINs
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are infrastructure-based, they are highly vulnerable in
the case of big disasters. PCNs in such cases can
become islands of connectivity, bridging several parts of
OINs and PINs together, as well as providing connectiv-
ity with the outside world.
ERCN architecture
ERCN is a network architecture formed on-the-fly in
case of emergencies. This interconnects various types of
networks through a WMN. Figure 4 shows a high-level
view of an example ERCN, consisting of two OINs, a
single PIN and two PCNs, interconnected through the
WMN. As described in Sect. 3, infrastructure-based net-
works such as TETRA, 3G, and WiMAX are highly vul-
nerable in the case of emergencies. It has been observed
that 3G networks for example, are often unable to pro-
vide communications, either because one or more of its
core components fail, or they are unable to cope with
sudden increases in users’ traffic. ERCN can provide
under these conditions an alternative path, routing the
traffic of these networks through the WMN. WMN has
a vital role within ERCN, providing interconnection
between heterogeneous multi-operator networks. It con-
sists of several types of devices:
• Operator mesh routers and gateways (OMRGs).
These devices belong to a specific operator, used as
a “glue” to the WMN. Their role is to handle traffic
between the OINs or PINs, and the WMN. Among
their functionalities can be the admission control,
QoS regulation, and data translation between
protocols.
• Mesh routers (MRs) that route traffic within
WMN. In general, routing protocols for mesh net-
works support multipath, QoS, link failure detection,
etc. (see [45,46]); thus, they provide robustness and
resilience to a number of failures.
• Mesh routers and gateways (MRGWs). These
devices do not belong to a specific operator but they
are core components of the WMN. Their role is to
provide routing, to translate data among heteroge-
neous protocols, to establish connections with
TETRA
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Private Communication Networks
Public Interest Network
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Figure 4 The Emergency Response Communication Network architecture.
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OMRGs or other networking devices (e.g., access
points, femtocells) that belong to PCNs, and to per-
form admission control.
• Mesh routers and access points (MRAPs). They
perform the same functionalities as MRs but they
also provide access point capabilities in order to
connect mesh clients (MCs).
WMN is the “heart” of the ERCN that can be
designed, deployed, and maintained based on a number
of different policies. First of all, the WMN can be a
dedicated wireless network for use only in emergencies.
The associated costs can be covered by public sector
operators, private sector operators or by both based on
pre-agreements. However, as big disasters do not hap-
pen very frequently, and the cost for the deployment
and maintenance of a metropolitan-scale WMN is high,
public as well private sector operators would be very
reluctant to follow such an approach. We believe that a
more appropriate approach would be the deployment of
a metropolitan WMN that is initially used for day-by-
day operations, and whenever an emergency occurs, it
switches on the emergency mode forming the ERCN.
Day-by-day operations can cover a very wide area of ser-
vice provisioning, such as public safety operations (video
surveillance, sensors for temperature and water levels
recording, etc.), e-governance, e-health, entertainment to
the public in large geographical areas, etc. For example,
smart cities, a recent technology trend, are mainly based
on ICT infrastructures for improving quality of life.
Therefore, the WMN could be initially part of such an
ICT infrastructure (part of a smart city formation), and
switch to the emergency mode, whenever it is necessary.
This will create incentives for operators coming from
both the public and the private sectors. Public sector
operators (e.g., authorities) by investing on the deploy-
ment of a metropolitan WMN can provide better ser-
vices to their public and at the same time, they can have
a backup network for support in emergencies. Private
sector operators by being able to rely on the ERCN in
emergencies, can enhance their profile and increase
their profits, as they can provide reliable communica-
tions even during big disasters. A pre-installed WMN
does not necessarily mean that no extra mesh devices
can be installed in case of emergencies. Indeed, as
WMNs are in general self-adapted networks due to sev-
eral of their core mechanisms (routing, channel assign-
ment, admission control, etc.), mesh nodes can be
deployed and connected to the WMN on demand. For
example, mesh nodes in balloons [35] can be easily
deployed to expand the WMN’s coverage.
Nevertheless, there are several challenges and require-
ments for the realization of the ECRN architecture, as it
must be robust, QoS-aware, secure, and able to provide
a common networking platform for different applica-
tions and technologies, interconnecting several multi-
operator heterogeneous networks.
Emergency detection and notification
By following the approach that the WMN is a pre-
installed mesh network used for day-by-day operations,
switching to the emergency operation only when neces-
sary, an appropriate mechanism is required for emer-
gency detection and triggering. This should give answers
to questions “when, how and by who is an emergency
alerted?”. There are several approaches to address those
questions.
• The WMN can be the alert triggering mechanism.
As the WMN is (in its default status) used for public
safety, several sensors deployed throughout the net-
work can monitor and report measurements related
to temperature, water levels, movements of the pub-
lic, etc. These measurements can be collected by a
fusion command center and then, by using the
appropriate algorithms, if one or more thresholds
are violated, WMN will change its status to emer-
gency and it will notify all the networks (OINs,
PINs), their operators have contractual agreements
with it.
• Another approach is the WMN to be triggered by
other networks. This can allow public or private
operators (that have contractual agreements) owning
OINs or PINs to trigger and join WMN, whenever
they are in an emergency situation. For example, if a
big explosion takes place nearby the CN of a 3G
operator (Figure 1), and communication between a
number of BSs with the CN becomes infeasible,
WMN could be triggered and used as a backup path
for the data and signalling of the 3G network.
For both approaches, security mechanisms are
required for authentication and encryption of the emer-
gency detection and notification messages.
ERCN deployment
ERCN deployment involves the process of forming its
topology by attaching to the core WMN, any available
OINs, PINs and PCNs. Here we make a distinction
between two classes:
• Attaching OINs or PINs. In emergency cases,
OINs and PINs join ERCN so they can route traffic
through the WMN. In order the joining to become
feasible, two requirements have to be met: there
must be contractual agreements between the opera-
tors of these networks with the operator of the
WMN, and parts of their critical infrastructure must
have survived from a disaster. After the emergency
detection and notification takes place, interested
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networks can join ERCN through appropriate
authentication and admission control mechanisms.
This process can be initiated by the WMN or the
other networks, and topology discovery can be based
on beaconing transmissions, so interested parties can
discover each other.
• Attaching PCNs. Attaching PCNs to the ERCN
has several challenges. PCNs are owned by indivi-
duals, meaning that network devices within these
networks (e.g., access points, femtocells) may operate
under different policies. Some may be free for use,
while other may deploy several security mechanisms
(e.g., WPA2), so their use by the ERCN is not
straightforward. Furthermore, current legislation
does not allow use of private network resources for
emergency operations. For these reasons, there are a
few requirements for the re-tasking of PCNs. Re-
tasking was defined in [47] as the use of the existing
networks for emergency response purposes. We
extend this definition to include PCNs as well. For
the successful re-tasking of the PCNs, legislation
issues have to be solved (e.g., if an ERCN can use
private communication resources), and technical
solutions have to be invented. Supposing legislation
has adapted so as PCNs can be retasked, technical
approaches can include: (i) the network equipment
been equipped with credentials (e.g., long-term keys)
that can be used to generate connection keys, (ii)
the network equipment been reset by its owners in
emergency situations so no access control is
enforced for its use (however, this can make ERCN
very vulnerable to attacks), and (iii) the authorities
can re-task the network equipment using “technol-
ogy requisition”, a process similar to police requisi-
tion. The last option can be performed with the
appropriate software for hacking into the network
equipment. Of course, this would require additional
legislation adaptations to become legal.
Inter-operability
As ERCN provides a common platform interconnecting
several heterogeneous networks, interoperability is of
high importance. Inter-operability can be defined as the
capability of “gluing” together several heterogeneous
technologies, referring to two main mechanisms:
• Transparent communication. This is the ability to
send traffic between networks based on different
technologies. As Figure 4 shows, gateways (OMRGs)
exist between the WMN and the interconnected net-
works. One of their roles is to provide “translation”
between different communication protocols. In gen-
eral, interworking between heterogenous networks
can be applied using four architectures: very tight
coupling, tight coupling, loose coupling, and open
coupling. Each method has its own advantages and
disadvantages (see [48,49]). We suggest the very
tight coupling approach where OMRGs (that belong
to the corresponding operators and not to WMN)
are “glued” to the backbone that connects the var-
ious BSs to their corresponding CN. Using this type
of coupling, any failures to the highly vulnerable
CNs will not affect the operation of the OMRGs
that will still be able to route traffic through the
WMN. Of course, redundant OMRGs could be
placed in several other places such as between the
RNC and the 3 G CN (Figure 4), so if any failures
occur in one of the BSs or the RNC, communica-
tions will not be severely disrupted, as the redundant
OMRGs will handle the traffic through the mesh
network. The number of the deployed OMRGs
within a network depends on the trade-off between
cost and robustness, as the more devices of this type
are available, the more robust the network is but at
the same time deployment and maintenance cost
increase.
• Handover is the mechanism for seamless handoff
between different networks. Horizontal handover is
the handoff between networks of the same technol-
ogy, while vertical handover is the handoff between
networks with different technologies. In emergencies,
MCs may need to perform handover as several net-
works or parts of them can become inoperable.
Major challenges for successful seamless handover is
QoS and admission control. QoS should be guaran-
teed even if a MC performs handoff to a different
network using the same or different technology.
Admission control for interworking refers to the
appropriate security mechanisms that must exist to
provide authentication and authorization for MCs
during handovers.
User/traffic classification and prioritization
Depending on a user/traffic classification, different
trade-offs regarding security, cost, traffic prioritization,
and general performance requirements could exist
within the ERCN. For example, first responders could
be assigned higher bandwidth for their communications
than individuals. Additionally, depending on the critical-
ity, different types of traffic could have higher priority
than others. As an example, video and voice transmitted
from a disaster area by an injured person in a life threa-
tening situation, could have higher priority than routine
communications performed by first responders. There-
fore, user and traffic classification should be performed
in both a proactive, as well as in a reactive manner.
In a typical disaster scenario, as soon as a call has
been received by an emergency operator (e.g., police,
Fragkiadakis et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2011, 2011:13
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2011/1/13
Page 11 of 16
fire department), first responders are immediately dis-
patched in the disaster area. In such situations, a large
number of users like authorities, first responders and
individuals are involved and communication resources
are heavily used by them. Table 2 shows a possible clas-
sification of users and applications within the ERCN
(incident commanders are the persons in charge among
the first responders personnel).
During emergency operations, requirements and QoS
may dynamically need to change as different user/traffic
combinations request more bandwidth in, for example,
life threatening situations. A reactive scheme could
dynamically compute and assign new priority values
depending on a multi-objective optimization function Fo
as Pi, j = Fo(I1, I2, ... Ij), where P is a priority metric, i is
referred to users, j to applications, and I refers to several
input parameters that can include: (i) the monitored
data from the network (e.g., throughput, delay, etc.), (ii)
input from users (e.g., commands from the authorities),
(iii) location-based information that for example shows
that a person is located in a disaster area and needs to
be assigned a higher communication priority.
Security requirements
For the ERCN to become feasible, security mechanisms
have to be present to provide authentication, authoriza-
tion, admission control and message integrity between
all networking devices and applications. A security fra-
mework is necessary to protect against several types of
attackers (external, dishonest clients, dishonest opera-
tors, etc.) with different objectives (unauthorized access
to the provided services, unauthorized access to client
data and meta-data, denial of service, operators gaining
advantage of their competitors, etc.) (see [50]).
In this section, we focus on the security requirements
regarding the WMN and its interactions with the rest of
the networks. Security requirements specific to different
technologies (e.g TETRA, 3G) are out of the scope of
this article.
• Authentication and access control enforcement.
This can be performed distributed or centralized,
using authentication servers located remotely or
locally. As the ERCN is used in emergencies, several
networking devices may become inoperable, so any
centralized-based authentication mechanisms will be
very vulnerable to failures because of several
potential single point of failures. On the other hand,
a highly distributed mechanism may introduce a sig-
nificant overhead to the communication parties,
reducing the overall QoS. We believe that an appro-
priate mechanism should follow a hybrid approach.
Devices that are less vulnerable to failures (e.g., bet-
ter physically protected) located in strategic locations
can serve as secondary authentication servers (SUSs).
The primary authentication servers (PUSs) can be
located at the CNs of each operator’s network.
Through an efficient authentication mechanism,
interested communication parties will decide which
authentication server to contact, based upon para-
meters such as server and network connectivity, ser-
ver load, delay, etc. As OMRGs are placed in
strategic locations in the ERCN (Figure 4), they
could also play the role of the SUSs.
In extremely big disasters, there is always the danger
that no authentication can be supported because no
SUSs or PUSs are available. However, parts of the
associated networks may still operate. In such condi-
tions, a traffic/user classification scheme (Sect. 5.3.4)
could allow special MCs (e.g., first responders, etc.)
to access network resources based on pre-defined
credentials. For example, MCs carrying mobile
phones whose International Mobile Subscriber Iden-
tity (IMSI) numbers (see [51]) are prestored into a
database, can be granted access to the ERCN using
an authentication scheme based on long term keys
stored in each device. The challenges here are
related to the selection of the nodes storing the
IMSI database and how often this is updated.
• Key management for user handover. In the
ERCN, MCs may traverse from network to network;
thus specific requirements have to be addressed for
secure and QoS-aware user handover. Requirements
include fast authentication, long term keys indepen-
dent from connection keys, frequent update of the
keys, etc. [50].
• Secure routing. As WMNs are multi-hop net-
works, packets flow through several paths to reach
their destinations. Routing algorithms play a signifi-
cant role in the performance of a WMN, therefore
secure routing is of vital importance. General
requirements of the routing protocols include: adap-
tation to changes in the network topology, robust-
ness to cope with link and node failures, and
efficiency not to over consume computation and
network resources [52]. Efficient secure routing algo-
rithms should satisfy requirements related to authen-
tication between the packet sources and the
intermediate nodes, integrity of routing information
to prevent tampering or corruption of the routing
data, and confidentiality to prevent eavesdropping.
Table 2 User/traffic classification
Users Traffic
Authorities Video
Incident commanders Audio/voice
First responders Push-to-talk
Individuals RTT
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• Data integrity and confidentiality. A multihop
WMN, such the one proposed in the ERCN, is sus-
ceptible to several attacks like passive eavesdropping,
man-in-the-middle attacks, byzantine attacks, etc.,
that threaten both the network itself, as well as its
interconnected networks. General countermeasures
against those types of attacks include: (i) end-to-end
protection using TLS [53], SSH [54], IPsec [55],
VPN [56], (ii) link-by-link protection using algo-
rithms like HMAC [57,58], AES [59], WPA2 [60],
and (iii) route segment protection where only part of
the routing path is protected.
• Intrusion detection. The previous security
requirements address issues related to intrusion pre-
vention. However, there is always the possibility that
adversaries manage to bypass part of the protection
mechanisms; therefore a second line of defense is of
paramount importance. Intrusion detection algo-
rithms make this feasible by protecting against intru-
sions/attacks in several layers. Several attacks can
target the physical layer through jamming, generat-
ing interference and severely disrupting the network
operations [61]. Usually, the MAC protocol used in
WMNs is based on carrier sense (CSMA/CA), as the
widely used IEEE 802.11 protocol. Attacks in this
layer can include MAC address spoofing, transmis-
sion of spurious MAC frames (e.g., RTS, CTS, ACK)
[62], as well as greedy behaviors by cheating on
backoff rules [63,64]. Furthermore, there are attacks
targeting the network layer such as spurious routing
messages, as well as several attacks targeting higher
layers like port scanning attacks [65] and SYN
attacks [66]. An effective and robust intrusion detec-
tion system should include probes for measurement
collection and combination from different layers
(cross-layer), as well as to fuse measurements pro-
vided by different monitoring nodes. For example,
monitors placed into different locations can collect
SNR (signal-to-noise) values informing a fusion cen-
ter that takes the ultimate decision about the pre-
sence of an attacker and triggers the appropriate
mitigation mechanisms.
• Mitigation that involves the actions taken when an
attack is detected and classified. Several techniques
can be used to mitigate different types of attacks.
For example, jamming attacks can be mitigated
using channel switching [67]. Other mechanisms can
provide general attack recovery as multi-path routing
that can bypass routes which have been attacked,
power and rate control that adapts power and rate
to increase the energy received per information bit,
and mechanism hoping that combines channel hop-
ing and power and rate control [50].
The security mechanisms of the ERCN, both intrusion
detection and intrusion prevention will aim to protect
not only the core WMN but the other networks that are
attached to it as well. Attacks originating from the
WMN could severely disrupt the operation of an
attached network. For example, a compromised node in
the WMN (Figure 4) can severely disrupt the attached
3G network, by sending IP packets in pre-defined inter-
vals to one of its connected IP clients (see [68]).
Signalling
ERCN, as a future emergency network should extend
the functionalities of the current voice-centric emer-
gency networks to include applications such as VoIP,
real time video, etc. For the support of these types of
applications, except the bandwidth requirements for
data transmission, a signalling protocol is required. This
protocol handles the creation, modification and termina-
tion of the sessions between the participants. The Ses-
sion Initiation Protocol (SIP) [69], is a widely used
application-layer signalling protocol that allows partici-
pants to agree on a set of supported media types. This
follows a client/server model with several servers and
related proxies. However, SIP is centralized in nature, so
highly vulnerable to failures. Therefore, a distributed sig-
naling protocol is required for the ERCN. Through a
carefully designed mechanism, SIP proxies’ duties could
be assigned to several nodes of the WMN or to nodes
belonging to OINs (or PINs), providing SIP functionality
when there is no connectivity to the default SIP servers.
The main requirements of such a scheme is load balan-
cing and secure authentication (see [70]).
Video streaming performance evaluation in a
multi-radio metropolitan wireless mesh network
As ERCN’s scope is the provision of ubiquitous commu-
nications, including video transmission; in this section we
investigate the video streaming performance, in terms of
delay, throughput and packet loss, in a multi-radio
metropolitan WMN. The metropolitan WMN we use for
the measurements is deployed in Heraklion, Crete-
Greece by FORTH [71]. The network covers an area of
60 km2 containing 14 mesh nodes, equipped with direc-
tional antennas. We use static IP addressing, OLSR [72]
for routing, and IEEE 802.11 as the MAC protocol. Fig-
ure 5 shows the topology of the mesh network. The two
gateways of the mesh network are the nodes K1 and K4,
denoted also with the letter ‘G’ on their side. Node K1 is
connected to the global internet via FORTH, as the line
drawn from K1 to M1-FORTH shows. Node K4 is
located at the University of Crete and it is connected to
the global internet via the GRNET network, a network
that connects the universities and research centers of
Greece to the global Internet.
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The setup of the trial nodes include a server, located
at FORTH’s premises, playing the role of an Internet
server and a client computer located at the node K3 of
the metropolitan mesh network. In the server, we
installed the Darwin Server [73] for streaming video. On
the client side at node K3, we use the openRTSP client
[74] for receiving video streams. Prior to running any
experiments, we used a channel assignment algorithm
(see [75]) that automatically assigned channels to the
mesh nodes by taking into account both intra-network
and external interferences.
We ran the experiment several times. For each experi-
ment the traffic flows from M1 to K3 through the gate-
way K1 (Figure 5). In order to perform realistic
measurements, we added background traffic to the mesh
network. This was performed to create intra-network
interference to the links. Each node of the mesh net-
work transmitted background traffic by sending ICMP
packets of size 1400 bytes every 100 ms to all of its one-
hop neighbors. Note that the measurements refer to the
end-to-end performance.
Table 3 shows the mean values of the evaluation
metrics. The packet delay is much lower than the mini-
mum recommended delay of 1 sec defined in [7] (men-
tioned in Sect. 2.1). Regarding throughput, the 2.023
Mbps shows that the network can support traffic gener-
ated by both MPEG4 and MPEG2 coders (the minimum
bit rates of the coders are given in Sect. 2.1). For the
packet loss, according to [7] a maximum packet loss of
0.1% is recommended when MPEG4 coding is used
without error concealment and/or correction to be
necessary. Our measured packet loss is much lower
than this limit.
Conclusions
Current technologies used for emergency response
operations mainly provide voice-centric services. These
Figure 5 FORTH’s Metropolitan Wireless Mesh Network [76].
Table 3 Video streaming performance evaluation
Throughput Delay Packet loss
2.023 Mbps 6.137 ms 0.003%
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networks are mainly infrastructure based; thus highly
vulnerable to big disasters, as many reports have high-
lighted. Future emergency networks are envisioned as
architectures that provide more advanced applications
such as live video streaming, voice-over-IP, location
information, status, etc. All these applications require
high bandwidth demands that current networks cannot
provide.
This work, after identifying the applications and func-
tionalities a future emergency network should support,
proposed an architecture than can, through a wireless
mesh network, provide a common platform in the case
of emergencies by interconnecting several heterogeneous
multi-operator networks. We also described several
requirements regarding security, network deployment,
and traffic/user prioritization and then, we proposed
several approaches that be used to meet those require-
ments. In addition, we described several approaches that
can be adapted to re-task communication resources
owned by independent individuals, for use by an emer-
gency response network.
Finally, we measured the performance of a video
streaming application in a real metropolitan wireless
multi-radio mesh network, showing that it can support
high quality video transmissions.
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